

March 2026

# 2025 Annual Status of Safety Report

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## Rail Fixed Guideway State Safety Oversight Program

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# Executive Summary

The Virginia Department of Rail and Public Transportation (DRPT) is the designated Rail State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) for the Commonwealth of Virginia. In this role, DRPT oversees the Hampton Roads Transit (HRT) Tide light rail system in Norfolk. The state safety oversight agency’s mission is the continuous verification that HRT is carrying out its documented programs to ensure the safety of its passengers and employees. The Virginia Railway Express and Amtrak are overseen by the FRA. Safety matters for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority are overseen by the Washington Metropolitan Safety Commission, on which the DRPT Director serves as an alternate to the Secretary of Transportation.

DRPT’s Transit Rail Safety and Emergency Management Administrator manages DRPT’s oversight program with support from contracted consultant staff who possess subject matter expertise and certifications in train signaling, civil engineering, rail operations, and related disciplines. Funding for the State Safety Oversight (SSO) program is provided through Federal Transit Administration (FTA) dedicated formula grants matched with dollars from the Commonwealth Mass Transit Fund.

In its oversight role, DRPT:

- Conducts audits and inspections (both announced and unannounced) of the HRT Tide system;
- Reviews and adopts safety event investigations; and
- Tracks and verifies HRT’s progress in correcting safety and security deficiencies.

## Approved Documents

DRPT formally approved HRT’s Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan (SEPP) Version 8.3 on July 14, 2025, and HRT’s Agency Safety Plan (ASP), Version 6, on December 19, 2025.

## Triennial Audits

- **March 2025:** HRT Security and Emergency Preparedness Management.
- **October 2025:** HRT Multi-Department: Finance, Marketing and Communications, Internal Audit, Records Management, Planning and Development, Engineering and Facilities, Technology, and Human Resources.

## Inspections

Month	Inspection Topic(s)
January	Light Rail Vehicle (LRV) Wheel Profile
April	Operations Rules Compliance and Train Handling
June	(1) Track Slab Pumping (2) Central Business District (CBD) Signals Maintenance
September	Lockout/Tagout Process Compliance
October	Grade Crossing Signals Maintenance

## Safety Events

Effective January 1, 2025, DRPT adopted the term “safety event” in place of “accident,” “incident,” or “occurrence,” consistent with revisions to 49 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Part 674. In 2025, HRT experienced three safety events that met the criteria for reporting to the FTA.

Two of the three safety events occurred on May 23, 2025, and one occurred on October 1, 2025. Summaries are provided below.

**1. FTA Safety event 1**

- a. This derailment occurred on May 23, 2025, in the West Yard of the Norfolk Tide Facility (NTF). A hostler failed to verify proper switch alignment prior to movement. The root cause was determined to be operating rule violations/human factors.

**2. FTA Safety event 2**

- a. This collision between two light rail vehicles occurred on May 23, 2025, on Track 4 east of the NTF. A hostler and a light rail vehicle Maintenance Technician failed to conduct required safety stops and to provide proper hand signals. The root cause was determined to be operating rule violations/human factors.

**3. FTA Safety event 3**

- a. This collision with more than one injury occurred on October 1, 2025, when a Tide train departing Fort Norfolk Station collided with a private occupancy vehicle (POV). The root cause of the event was determined to be the actions of the POV driver.

## FTA Triennial Audit of DRPT SSO Program

Between June 3-5, 2024, the FTA conducted its triennial audit of the DRPT State Safety Oversight (SSO) program. The FTA issued its final report to DRPT on October 10, 2024, with the following findings identified:

- **Finding 1:** VDRPT did not demonstrate its employees, and other personnel are qualified to perform their functions.
- **Finding 2:** VDRPT did not electronically submit an annual report with all the requirements in 49 C.F.R. § 674.39(a) to FTA by March 15 or the new deadline if FTA issues an extension.

In 2025, the FTA approved both Corrective Action Plans (CAPs) that DRPT developed to address the Findings. Finding 2 has been closed. As of December 2025, DRPT SSO was still working with FTA on updating and submitting verification materials for Finding 1 and closure is pending FTA review.

## DRPT Compliance with FTA Actions and Regulations

The FTA issued Special Directive 22-49 to DRPT in October 2022, requiring the development and implementation of a Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) program. Previously in 2024, DRPT SSOA refined its existing inspection program to comply with the requirements of Special Directive 22-49. These refinements were made to DRPT's inspection program (protocol), technical training plan (TTP), and workload assessment to comply with the Special Directive 22-49 requirements. The FTA formally certified DRPT's RBI program on December 4, 2024.

In 2025, DRPT implemented its RBI program and conducted six RBIs. In addition to conducting RBIs, DRPT continued to enhance its data tracking and analysis management system and worked with HRT to acquire all regular data submissions. Per its RBI program, DRPT also instituted quarterly prioritization meetings where DRPT and contractor personnel met to discuss the data analysis findings (potential risks), perform safety risk assessments, and prioritize its upcoming

RBI based on its analysis. On November 14, 2025, DRPT submitted six months' worth of data and information to the FTA to verify implementation of its RBI program.

In the previous calendar year on December 2, 2024, FTA also published the final version of CFR 49 Part 671: Rail Transit Roadway Worker Protection (RWP). The final Part 671 set minimum standards for RWP program elements, including an RWP manual and track access guide; requirements for on-track safety and supervision, job safety briefings, good faith safety challenges, and reporting unsafe acts and conditions and near-misses; development and implementation of risk-based redundant protections for workers; and establishment of RWP training and qualification and RWP compliance monitoring activities. Part 671 required that each SSOA coordinate with its covered rail transit agency/agencies (RTA) to review and approve RWP program elements one calendar year from December 2, 2024. Throughout 2025, DRPT worked cooperatively with HRT to ensure that HRT's RWP program met all requirements of Part 671, providing written feedback via checklists to HRT, as well as a discussion-based workshop. DRPT formally approved HRT's RWP program on November 25, 2025.

Finally, the FTA issued Safety Advisory 25-1 on November 24, 2025, regarding rail trespassing and suicide events. As recommended in the Safety Advisory, DRPT issued a notice to HRT on December 12, 2025, requesting that HRT analyze safety performance data related to trespassing and suicide events through its existing Safety Risk Management process outlined in its ASP and share the results with DRPT by March 2026. DRPT will review the data and provide the results of the analysis to the FTA by the deadline of May 22, 2026.

## Program Background and Overview

In 1996, FTA issued the Rail Fixed Guideway Systems State Safety Oversight Rule, 49 CFR Part 659. Under this rule, each state with rail fixed guideway systems not subject to the regulatory authority of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is responsible for overseeing the safety and security program implementation of these systems. Pursuant to Subdivision 16 of § 33.2-285 of the Code of Virginia, the designated SSOA is the DRPT in the Commonwealth of Virginia. DRPT oversees the HRT Tide light rail system in Norfolk, Virginia. The Virginia Railway Express and Amtrak are overseen by the FRA. Safety matters for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority are overseen by the Washington Metropolitan Safety Commission, on which the DRPT Director serves as an alternate to the Secretary of Transportation.

The FTA certified DRPT's State Safety Oversight (SSO) program under 49 CFR Part 674 on April 4, 2018. This regulation directs eligible states to significantly strengthen their authority to oversee and enforce safety requirements to prevent and mitigate safety events on rail fixed guideway systems subject to oversight. Additionally, it mandates eligible states to demonstrate legal and financial independence from these rail transit systems, as well as provide the necessary financial and human resources for overseeing the number, size, and complexity of rail transit systems within their jurisdictions. While the regulation does not mandate oversight of security practices at the rail transit system, DRPT maintains this authority over HRT security and emergency preparedness programs as authorized by the Code of Virginia. This report details State Safety Oversight activities at the HRT Tide light rail system<sup>1</sup> from January 1 through December 31, 2025.

## State Safety Oversight Responsibilities

DRPT's SSO program activities are intended to ensure that the rail transit agency (RTA) places safety considerations over operational expediency in all decision making. An important distinction should be made in delineating the role of the SSOA versus the role of the RTA in maintaining and improving rail safety. The SSOA's role is that of the regulator ensuring that all the mechanisms in place at the RTA are sound and unconditionally applied. The state does not perform day-to-day functions at the RTA. Alternatively, the RTA's role is to perform all necessary programmatic, procedural, technical, engineering, and operational activities that it has formally adopted to maintain safety in rail operations.

DRPT's oversight mission is to continuously verify that the RTA is carrying out its documented programs to ensure the safety of its passengers and employees. DRPT's oversight efforts are fully transparent to HRT. All DRPT's actions, including those that denote various deficiencies at HRT, are communicated objectively with the goal of improving HRT's rail safety posture. Although HRT's Safety and Security Departments are the custodians of HRT's safety and security programs, the entire organization, including its senior executives, middle managers, supervisors, and frontline personnel, is empowered and responsible for upholding its safety goals.

The entirety of this oversight effort is called the "Program." The activities of the DRPT oversight program are described in a document titled the Safety and Security Program Standard (SSPS). As mandated by federal regulation, the SSPS contains a description of DRPT's organizational

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<sup>1</sup> An interstate compact was enacted on August 22, 2017, creating the Washington Metrorail Safety Commission (WMSC). Effective March 18, 2019, the WMSC is the designated State Safety Oversight Agency for WMATA Metrorail. To learn more about WMSC's oversight role, please visit <https://wmsc.gov/oversight/>.

structure and lines of authority that support the oversight program. It also lists DRPT's protocols for operating a federally compliant SSO program. The SSPS is a dynamic document that undergoes annual review and updates to reflect enhancements to the program. This document and its practices are subject to FTA review.

## Key Program Activities

Throughout the year, the SSOA's key program activities include:

- Organizing and participating in regular work sessions with HRT rail safety, security, operations, and maintenance personnel.
- Conducting audits, inspections, and special assessments of HRT's light rail operations.
- Reviewing and approving primary HRT rail safety, security, and emergency preparedness plans.
- Conducting and/or adopting rail investigations of safety events occurring on the HRT Tide light rail system.
- Tracking and verifying HRT's progress in correcting safety and security gaps on its light rail system; and,
- Briefing executive leadership at DRPT and in the Governor's office on key SSOA issues, as needed.

## Staffing

The Transit Rail Safety and Emergency Management Administrator (Administrator) oversees DRPT's SSO program and reports directly to the DRPT Director. The current Administrator, Andrew Ennis, performs all programmatic decision making and supervisory tasks with the support of contracted consultants. The consultant staff include subject matter experts (SMEs) in the fields of train signaling, engineering, track and structures, rail vehicles, and rail operations. The Public Transportation Safety Certification Program (PTSCPT) Final Rule, 49 CFR Part 672, implements a uniform safety certification training curriculum and requirements for individuals who conduct safety reviews, inspections, examinations, and other safety oversight activities of public transportation systems operated by public transportation agencies and those who are directly responsible for safety oversight of public transportation agencies.

## Budget & Funding

The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT), through the FTA provide dedicated annual formula grant funding to states with SSO responsibilities. This formula funding is based on the number of rail modes overseen by the state agency and the scale of the RTA's operation – such as track miles, passenger trips, and revenue miles. Grant funds from previous grants can be carried forward, and SSO's apply for new funds annually. These FTA formula grant funds can be utilized for program administration and activities including but not limited to SSO staff salaries, FTA-mandated training, consultant services, and equipment purchases. In 2025, the DRPT oversight program budget was \$1,385,474. This was comprised of FTA formula grant funds of

\$1,108,379 (80%) that are matched with \$277,095 (20%) from the Commonwealth Mass Transit Fund<sup>2</sup>. DRPT utilizes this funding for various eligible purposes that include:

- Staff salary,
- Consultant support,
- Routine state safety program activities,
- Annual FTA certifications and accredited rail standards training courses,
- Dedicated response vehicle, and
- Equipment needed to perform program activities.

## Program Highlights from 2025

All SSOA program components command equal significance. These program components are designed to be symbiotic, with information and intelligence gathered in one program element informing another. For instance, information gathered in a triennial audit might inform a safety event investigation. In the same manner, a finding of cause discovered during a safety event investigation might spur closer scrutiny of a certain practice at the RTA, prompting a risk-based inspection by SSOA staff.

### Approval of Program Documents

Federal regulation mandates that the SSOA annually review and approve key documents associated with safety and security at the rail transit system. Accordingly, in 2025, DRPT reviewed and approved HRT's Security and Emergency Preparedness Plan, Version 8.3, on July 14, 2025.

The Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) Final Rule, 49 CFR Part 673, requires certain operators of public transportation systems that receive federal funds to develop safety plans that include the processes and procedures to implement safety management systems and safety performance targets. Part 673 also requires an annual review and update of the PTASP. DRPT formally approved HRT's PTASP, Version 6, on December 19, 2025.

### Triennial Audits

One of the mechanisms DRPT utilizes to assess the ongoing health of HRT's rail safety performance is the triennial audit process. Triennial audits gauge the level to which safety is integrated into rail operations, maintenance, training, human resources, procurement, engineering, quality assurance departments, and management structure. All these separate departments support the safe operation of the rail system. The methodology associated with the triennial audits is the continuous and robust assessment of all these departments and their documented efforts at ensuring safety of HRT's passengers and employees. Instead of a single audit of the entire program being conducted once every three years, DRPT conducts this audit on a continual three-year cycle.

During these audits, if DRPT concludes that any aspects of HRT's documented programs related to rail safety are not being executed as officially described, DRPT will record these as findings, known as Findings of Noncompliance (FNCs). FNCs are identified as areas where HRT is not complying with its own plans, policies, or procedures, or with external regulations, guidelines, and adopted standards. Additionally, DRPT will identify Observation with Recommendations if the

<sup>2</sup> Code of Virginia 33.2-285, 33.2-1526, and Item 433 of Chapter 2 of the 2024 Special Session 1 Acts of Assembly.

RTA lacks a plan, policy, or procedure, or lacks the resources or capabilities to implement a safety- or security-related process or program. HRT is required to address such FNCs through corrective action plans (CAPs). These CAPs can take the form of recalibrating a program or procedure to better match their practical applications, reinstruction, or instituting new procedures or programs. DRPT reviews and approves all CAPs proposed by HRT and monitors these CAPs to ensure completion within established timeframes.

DRPT conducted two triennial audits of HRT during 2025: in March and December. Both triennial audits were conducted on-site. HRT submitted documents subject to audit early for review and interviews with HRT personnel were pre-scheduled and conducted.

The March triennial audit assessed HRT's Security and Emergency Management department, including implementation of the PTASP and SEPP, as well as compliance with relevant policies and procedures. This audit did not result in any FNCs, however, DRPT did identify five Observations with Recommendations.

The December triennial audit assessed HRT's administrative departments, which included: Finance, Marketing and Communications, Internal Audit, Records Management, Planning and Development, Engineering and Facilities, Technology, and Human Resources including implementation of the PTASP, as well as compliance with relevant policies and procedures. As of this writing, the final report from this audit has not yet been finalized; if there are any FNCs identified from this audit, DRPT will ensure HRT follows the CAP process to address the findings.

## DRPT Oversight of Corrective Actions

DRPT actively monitors HRT's corrective action plans (CAPs) and will continue to support HRT in resolving open corrective actions. DRPT engages with HRT regularly to monitor the progress of the closure and verification of CAPs from various sources, including, but not limited to: DRPT triennial audits and risk-based inspections, safety events, HRT internal safety reviews, and HRT drills or exercises.

One of the requirements of the CAP process is that the HRT must provide an estimated completion date that is both realistic and practical. The estimated completion date should be based on the severity and complexity of the finding the CAP is designed to address. Because of this, it is understood that some CAPs may have a shorter estimated completion period while others may have estimated completion plans that could span several months or years. CAPs with long-term estimated completion dates are acceptable with continued monitoring. A final completion date is assigned when a CAP is verified by DRPT as ready for closure. In 2025, DRPT verified and approved 43 HRT CAPs, as shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1: 2025 HRT CAPs Closed by DRPT.

## Inspection Program

The DRPT inspection program is intended as a cooperative effort with HRT to assess the safety and security of operations and maintenance practices. Additionally, it is used to verify overall compliance with federal rules and standards as well as all relevant HRT rules, standards, and procedures on an ongoing basis. The program allows DRPT to:

- Assess areas of heightened risk based on data and information.
- Identify potential problem areas requiring further investigation and solution development.
- Assist HRT by providing independent evaluations of procedural and rules compliance.
- Gain consistent involvement in HRT operations, maintenance, and safety programs.

Throughout 2025, DRPT implemented its RBI program, which was formally approved by the FTA on December 4, 2024. DRPT’s RBI program is based on safety, maintenance, and operations data and information that it and HRT collect; this data is regularly analyzed to identify trends and potential areas of heightened risk. As part of its implementation, DRPT instituted quarterly prioritization meetings in 2025, where DRPT and contractor personnel met to discuss the data analysis findings (potential risks), perform safety risk assessments, and prioritize its upcoming RBIs based on that analysis.

Inspections typically last one to two days and involve multiple topics and types of observations or reviews, some of them simultaneous. Inspection activities are based on both a regular rotation of subject matter areas as well as areas of heightened risk. Areas of heightened risk are determined through extensive data analysis. Inspection activities can include the following areas of focus:

- Rail Vehicles,
- Vehicle Maintenance Facilities and Yards,
- Track Access/Roadway Worker Protection,
- Traction Power System,

- Signal System,
- Rail-Highway Grade Crossings,
- Operations Control Center, and
- Rule compliance results provided by HRT.

Inspections may be announced or unannounced. For announced inspections, DRPT may provide notice to HRT up to 24 hours before the inspection occurs. If DRPT anticipates an inspection will require specific HRT personnel or preparation, DRPT will provide advance notice to assist with scheduling. For unannounced inspections, DRPT personnel will arrive on the property without advanced notice to HRT. Inspections are conducted from public areas as well as on the Tide right-of-way. Inspections taking place from public areas, such as onboard trains, in stations, or from the street, will not be announced to the HRT personnel performing the operations or maintenance being observed. For any inspections performed on the Tide operating right-of-way, DRPT will provide advanced notification to HRT to ensure coordination and compliance with all HRT right-of-way access and permitting requirements. DRPT oversight program representatives will abide by all HRT safety rules and regulations while on HRT property, including roadway worker protection requirements.

DRPT will publish an inspection report detailing inspection activities after its conclusion. For each inspection, the report will document any Findings of Noncompliance, observations, violations, potential hazards, deficiencies, and areas for improvement. Like triennial audits, HRT is required to develop CAPs in response to FNCs identified in inspection reports. Even if no deficiencies are identified during an inspection, HRT often proactively addresses inspection items by generating corrective actions or mitigations.

In 2025, DRPT conducted the following inspections with identified FNCs:

Month	Inspection Topic(s)	Findings of Noncompliance
January	Light Rail Vehicle (LRV) Wheel Profile	None Identified.
April	Operations Rules Compliance and Train Handling	None Identified.
June	(1) Track Slab Pumping (2) Central Business District (CBD) Signals Maintenance	Track Slab Pumping: 1. DRPT issued a Directive to HRT to formalize its efforts to address the tracking pumping deficiency into a corrective action plan. This was issued following the inspection.  CBD Signals Maintenance 1. FNC-1: HRT has not established a formal procedure for routine signal or train detection system inspections within the CBD. 2. FNC-2: HRT's Rail Operations and Maintenance Plan is not consistent with the signal maintenance responsibilities clarified by the MOU with the City of Norfolk.
September	Lockout/Tagout Process Compliance	1. FNC-1: HRT lacks an enhanced LOTO training program. 2. FNC-2: HRT was unable to provide documentation verifying that the LOTO procedure was audited at an annual cadence, as required by SAF-106. 3. FNC-3: HRT was unable to provide documentation verifying that the LOTO procedure underwent quarterly reviews, as required by OPS-LRSY 304.

Month	Inspection Topic(s)	Findings of Noncompliance
October	Grade Crossing Signals Maintenance	1. FNC-1: HRT's wheel truing machine is unable to true power truck wheels since May 2024, despite a previous CAP intended to address the issue. This condition represents a critical maintenance deficiency requiring corrective action. DRPT requires HRT to submit a CAP specifically addressing the restoration or replacement of the wheel-truing machine to ensure timely and complete wheel maintenance.

## Safety Event Notifications and Investigations

Federal regulation requires rail transit agencies subject to oversight to notify the SSOA and the FTA of safety events that occur on the rail system. As of January 1, 2025, the FTA and DRPT no longer use the terms “accident,” “incident,” or “occurrence” and uses the term “safety event” pursuant to changes to 49 CFR Part 674. Some safety events require the transit agency to notify both the FTA and DRPT SSOA. These included fatalities, collisions, evacuations, and derailments. These are generally referred to as a “FTA-level Reportable” event. In addition to the FTA-Level safety events, DRPT requires HRT to provide additional notifications of safety events that do not meet the FTA definition for an event. These types of safety events include operational rule violations, signal system issues, and hazardous conditions on the alignment. These are generally referred to as a “State-level Reportable” events. At the end of 2024 and going into 2025, DRPT provided HRT with an updated SSPS Safety Event Matrix, which included the relevant updates to safety event notification and reporting requirements. DRPT also hosted multiple workshops with HRT Operations personnel to ensure full understanding of the updated 674 reporting requirements. All event notifications (FTA and State) are reported directly to the Administrator within the timeframes prescribed in the SSPS Safety Event Matrix.

As for safety event investigations, it is important to point out that all FTA-level reportable events require a full investigation into the root cause and contributing factors to the event. Whereas not all State-level reportable events require a full investigation. Rather, some State-level event might require a lower level of investigation and reporting to the SSOA. Per 49 CFR Part 674, DRPT is ultimately responsible for the sufficiency and thoroughness of all investigations, whether conducted by the DRPT or HRT. For those safety events that require an investigation, DRPT may exercise the following options:

- Authorize HRT to investigate on its behalf,
- DRPT can conduct its own independent investigation,
- In the event the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), FTA, or other federal entity launches an investigation into an HRT light rail safety event, DRPT will join the investigative process.

For all investigated safety events, DRPT reviews all investigation reports prepared by HRT for accuracy and adopts each report as its own official investigative report once all DRPT requirements have been met. DRPT also has the authority to request that the RTA initiate investigations of safety events and hazardous conditions and address immediate and time-sensitive safety situations at HRT that are not detailed in the Safety Event Matrix.

In 2025, there were 93 safety events at HRT, as shown in Figure 2 on the following page. Service delays and disruptions, a State-level reportable event, account for more than 50% of the reported events in 2025. Most of the Service delays were the result of “stop-and-proceed” orders being implemented at graded-crossings on the East end of the Tide alignment.




Figure 2: 2025 HRT Safety Events by Category.

The investigations into these safety events concluded:

- Of the 12 total collisions:
  - Three involved non-preventable collisions with **POVs** at the fault of the motorist;
  - Four involved non-preventable collisions with **animals**;
  - Four involved collisions with **fixed objects**, of which three were found to be preventable due to operating rule violations/human factors;
    - HRT generated a total of four CAPs for the three collisions resulting from operating rule violations, of which three were approved for implementation and closed by DRPT in 2025. The remaining CAP was closed by DRPT after the involved operator resigned from their position.
  - One involved an FTA-reportable collision between two **rail transit vehicles**, which was found to be the result of an operating rule violation/human factor.
    - HRT generated two CAPs associated with this FTA-reportable event, both of which were approved for implementation and closed by DRPT in 2025.
- The eight fires were found to be non-preventable.
  - Six were trash can fires and two brush/mulch fires; all eight fires were found to be caused by either passenger or pedestrian actions.
- Of the five total signal violations:
  - Three involved stop and proceed violations, one involved a red signal violation, and one involved a grade crossing indicator violation.
    - All five signal violations were found to be caused by operating rule violations/human factors.
    - HRT generated a CAP for each of these signal violations, for a total of five CAPs that were approved for implementation by DRPT in 2025. All five CAPs were closed as of the writing of this report.

Of the 93 safety events, **three** met the criteria for reporting safety events to the FTA, including one collision between two rail transit vehicles, one collision resulting in one or more injuries, and one derailment. HRT properly reported this event to the FTA. All investigation reports were reviewed and adopted by the DRPT Administrator. The three events are summarized below.

**1. FTA Safety event 1**

- a. This derailment occurred on May 23, 2025, in the West Yard of the Norfolk Tide Facility (NTF). A hostler failed to verify proper switch alignment prior to movement. The root cause was determined to be operating rule violations/human factors.

**2. FTA Safety event 2**

- a. This collision between two light rail vehicles occurred on May 23, 2025, on Track 4 east of the NTF. A hostler and an LRV Maintenance Technician failed to conduct required safety stops and provide proper hand signals. The root cause was determined to be operating rule violations/human factors.

**3. FTA Safety event 3**

- a. This collision with more than one injury occurred on October 1, 2025, when a Tide train departing Fort Norfolk Station collided with a private occupancy vehicle (POV). The root cause of the event was determined to be the actions of the POV driver.




Figure 3: Comparison of FTA Reportable and DRPT Reportable HRT Safety Events 2021 to 2025.

# DRPT Compliance with FTA Actions and Regulations

The FTA issued Special Directive 22-49 to DRPT in October 2022, requiring the development and implementation of a Risk-Based Inspection (RBI) program. Previously in 2024, DRPT SSOA refined its existing inspection program to comply with the requirements of Special Directive 22-49. These refinements were made to DRPT's inspection program (protocol), technical training plan (TTP), and workload assessment to comply with the Special Directive 22-49 requirements. The FTA formally certified DRPT's RBI program on December 4, 2024.

In 2025, DRPT implemented its RBI program and conducted six RBIs. In addition to conducting RBIs, DRPT continued to enhance its data tracking and analysis management system and worked with Hampton Roads Transit (HRT) to acquire all regular data submissions. Per its RBI program, DRPT also instituted quarterly prioritization meetings where DRPT and contractor personnel met to discuss the data analysis findings (potential risks), perform safety risk assessments, and prioritize its upcoming RBIs based on its analysis. On November 14, 2025, DRPT submitted six months' worth of data and information to the FTA to verify implementation of its RBI program.

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Finally, the FTA issued Safety Advisory 25-1 on November 24, 2025, regarding rail trespassing and suicide events. As recommended in the Safety Advisory, DRPT issued a notice to HRT on December 12, 2025, requesting that HRT analyze safety performance data related to trespassing and suicide events through its existing Safety Risk Management process outlined in its ASP and share the results with DRPT by March 2026. DRPT will review the data and provide the results of the analysis to the FTA by the deadline of May 22, 2026.